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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case arises out of a special proceeding conducted by 
the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities ("Board") to 
determine rates that would be generally available to 
telecommunications carriers seeking to negotiate or 
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arbitrate interconnection agreements under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 
Stat. 56 (1996) ("Telecommunications Act" or"1996 Act"). 
The Board decided to substitute these newly determined 
rates for the previously arbitrated rates in an 
interconnection agreement between AT&T Communications 
of New Jersey ("AT&T") and Bell-Atlantic New Jersey ("Bell 
Atlantic") (now known as Verizon New Jersey, Inc. 
("Verizon")). AT&T brought suit challenging the Board's 
substitution. Thereafter, the District Court entered an order 
affirming the Board's decision to substitute rates but 
reversing the Board on its methodology. On appeal, the New 
Jersey Division of the Ratepayer Advocate ("the Advocate"), 
which had been allowed to intervene in the proceedings, 
contends that the District Court erred in holding that the 
Board had the legal and statutory authority to substitute 
its own rates for those set by arbitration. We will not reach 
this issue, however, because we conclude that the Advocate 






There are three main parties to this appeal. The 
appellant, the Advocate, is an independent agency of the 
State of New Jersey that is authorized to appear as a party 
on behalf of ratepayers in all utility matters that are before 
the Board. N.J.S.A. S 13:1D-1. On the opposing side, the 
Board is an independent agency within the Executive 
Branch of the New Jersey State government, N.J.S.A. 
S 48:2-1, that has "general supervision and regulation of 
and jurisdiction and control over all public utilities," 
N.J.S.A. S 48:2-13(a). The Board is a state public utility 
commission. Federal law defines such entities as those 
which, under state law, have regulatory jurisdiction over 
intrastate operations of telecommunications carriers. 47 
U.S.C. S 153(41). The other main appellee is Verizon, a 
telecommunications carrier previously known as Bell 
Atlantic. 
 
To understand the somewhat complex procedural history 
of this case, we will begin with the statutory framework that 
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Congress established to deregulate local telephone markets. 
On February 8, 1996, Congress enacted the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 
110 Stat. 56 (1996). Section 101 of the Telecommunications 
Act inserted sections 251 to 261 into Title 47 of the United 
States Code. 110 Stat. at 61-80. 
 
For much of the history of telecommunications, federal 
law has carved out a regulatory role for state commissions 
such as the Board. Prior to 1996, state commissions 
pervasively regulated local telephone service and granted 
exclusive franchises to incumbent local exchange carriers 
("ILECs"), such as Bell Atlantic in New Jersey, to provide 
service in particular areas.1See In re Implementation of the 
Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, at P I.A.[hereinafter Local 
Competition Order], amended on other grounds by 11 FCC 
Rcd. 22,301 (1996). 
 
The Telecommunications Act ended these legal barriers to 
competition by providing that "[n]o State or local statute or 
regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may 
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any 
entity to provide any interstate or intrastate 
telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. S 253(a). With 
respect to local telephone service, Congress sought to 
create a transition mechanism from the pre-1996 ILEC area 
monopolies to a system of "facilities-based competition," 
i.e., competition based on network facilities other than 
those owned by the ILECs. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104- 
458, at 148 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 
124, 160. Network facilities are the physical infrastructure 
through which telecommunications carriers deliver their 
phone services. 
 
Congress recognized that removing the legal protections 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A local exchange carrier, or LEC, is "any person that is engaged in the 
provision of telephone exchange service or exchange access." 47 U.S.C. 
S 153(26). In laymen's terms, a LEC is a provider of local telephone 
service, and an incumbent local exchange carrier, or ILEC, is the LEC 
that, at the time of the adoption of the 1996 Act, provided exclusive 
telephone exchange service in a particular area. In 1996, Bell Atlantic 
was one of three ILECs in New Jersey. 
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traditionally afforded the ILECs would not, by itself, 
accomplish "facilities-based competition." In particular, 
Congress believed that the ILECs were gatekeepers of 
telephone consumers in their respective areas, in part, 
because of their control over local network facilities. See 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-204, at 74, reprinted in  1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 39-40. Congress further believed that new 
telecommunications carriers (a.k.a. "CLECs") 2 entering local 
telephone markets could not effectively compete with the 
ILECs if the new entrants were required to duplicate the 
ILECs' networks before providing local service. See Local 
Competition Order, at P I.C.10. 
 
Because of these concerns, Congress imposed certain 
affirmative duties on ILECs to advance the transition 
toward facilities-based competition. Thus, among other 
things, ILECs must: (1) permit requesting 
telecommunications carriers to interconnect their facilities 
with the ILEC's network, 47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(2); (2) lease 
certain elements of their local network to carriers"on an 
unbundled basis," that is, allow the use of individual pieces 
of the network, id. S 251(c)(3); (3) sell carriers, at wholesale 
rates, any telecommunications services that the ILEC 
provides to its own customers at retail rates, in order to 
allow those carriers to resell the services, id.  S 251(c)(4); 
and (4) allow carriers to construct facilities necessary for 
interconnection on the ILEC's premises, id.S 251(c)(6). 
 
The Telecommunications Act sets forth a procedure for 
arriving at the prices that an ILEC may charge 
telecommunications carriers for interconnection to the 
ILEC's local network ("interconnection rates"), as well as for 
the other services detailed above. Id. S 252. Thus, the 1996 
Act invites carriers to "negotiate" binding interconnection 
agreements with the ILEC. Id. S 252(a)(1). The 1996 Act 
allows parties to interconnection negotiations to petition the 
designated State Commission to mediate or to arbitrate any 
unresolved issues. Id. SS 252(a)(2), (b). Furthermore, State 
Commissions have certain powers with respect to arbitrated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A competitive local exchange carrier, or CLEC, is a LEC that is a new 
entrant into the local telephone service market. AT&T is a CLEC in New 
Jersey. 
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agreements, such as the power to accept or reject 




In New Jersey, the enactment of the Telecommunications 
Act in February 1996 led to the commencement of several 
proceedings. In December 1995, in anticipation of the 
passage of the Telecommunications Act, the Board began 
an investigation of the appropriate terms for local telephone 
competition in New Jersey. On June 19, 1996, after the 
enactment of the Telecommunications Act, the Board 
instituted a proceeding to establish the terms and 
conditions under which the local exchange market in New 
Jersey should be opened to competition (the "Generic 
Proceeding"). Thereafter, the Board stated that it would 
review interconnection agreements reached through 
arbitration, mediation, or negotiation in conformity with 47 
U.S.C. SS 251 and 252. The Board also stated that the 
Generic Proceeding would set rates, terms, and conditions 
that would be generally available for parties to adopt freely 
in negotiating and arbitrating interconnection agreements. 
 
After the Generic Proceeding was underway, a number of 
telecommunications carriers sought to avail themselves of 
the provisions of the Telecommunications Act by 
negotiating or arbitrating interconnection agreements with 
ILECs. One of these carriers was AT&T, which, on March 1, 
1996, asked Bell Atlantic to enter into an interconnection 
agreement pursuant to 47 U.S.C. S 252(a). Following 
negotiations with Bell Atlantic, AT&T petitioned the Board 
on July 15, 1996 to arbitrate several unresolved issues. The 
Board allowed the arbitration ("AT&T/Bell Atlantic 
arbitration") to be conducted by outside experts. 
 
On August 7, 1996, the Board noted the existence of 
ongoing negotiations and arbitrations between carriers and 
ILECs to set interconnection rates, but nevertheless decided 
to continue with the Generic Proceeding, stating that "the 
information developed in [the Generic Proceeding] may well 
be relevant in assisting the Board to avoid disparate or 
inconsistent decisions with respect to the issues in[the] 
arbitrations." (App. at 38sa). A short while later, on August 
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15, 1996, the Board rejected the Advocate's request to 
participate in the arbitrations, reasoning that the 
arbitrations were two-party affairs and that the Advocate 
would have the opportunity to comment in the Generic 
Proceeding before the Board ruled on individual agreements 
resulting from the pending negotiations and arbitrations. 
 
The Board invited numerous parties to participate in the 
Generic Proceeding. Testimony began on November 4, 1996, 
and lasted for twenty days. The Advocate and 
representatives of 11 segments of the telecommunications 
industry attended the hearings. Fifteen parties submitted 
briefs and four different cost studies were presented. At the 
conclusion, the Board determined a number of rates and 
conditions for interconnection and other services under the 
Telecommunications Act (the "generic rates"). 
 
Four days after the beginning of testimony in the Generic 
Proceeding, the AT&T/Bell Atlantic arbitration concluded 
with the arbitrator's decision on November 8, 1996. The 
arbitrator found that AT&T's cost analysis, a computer- 
based model called the Hatfield Model Version 2.2 ("Hatfield 
Model"), properly calculated the economic costs of 
interconnection. Using a modified version of the Hatfield 
model, the arbitrator established rates that would last for 
the term of the AT&T/Bell Atlantic agreement. 
 
The arbitrator rejected Bell Atlantic's argument that the 
arbitrated rates should have only interim status pending 
the Board's ongoing action to establish the generic rates 
and terms. The AT&T/Bell Atlantic agreement was unique 
in that, while all other negotiated and arbitrated 
agreements between telecommunications carriers and Bell 
Atlantic had used rates that would remain effective only 
until the conclusion of the Generic Proceeding, the 
AT&T/Bell Atlantic agreement incorporated arbitrated rates 
that would last for the duration of the agreement without 
regard to the Generic Proceeding. 
 
Following the arbitrator's decision, Bell Atlantic 
petitioned the Board to reverse the arbitrator. On July 17, 
1997, at a public meeting, the Board ruled that the higher 
generic rates would supercede the arbitrated rates in the 
AT&T/Bell Atlantic interconnection agreement. On 
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September 9, 1997, the Board ordered AT&T to submit a 
fully executed agreement reflecting the Board's decision to 
use the generic rates. Under protest, AT&T complied. At a 
public meeting on October 8, 1997, the Board approved the 
AT&T/Bell Atlantic agreement incorporating the generic 
rates. 
 
On December 2, 1997, the Board issued a written order 
memorializing the decisions that it had rendered at its 
previous public meetings. In the memorandum, the Board 
explained what it considered to be the flaws of the 
AT&T/Bell Atlantic arbitration, specifically with regard to 
the Hatfield Model. The Board wrote that the information 
before the arbitrator was neither as extensive nor as 
accurate as that before the Board during the Generic 
Proceeding. Furthermore, the Board expressed concern that 
"different arbitrators, looking essentially at the same facts, 
may arrive at inconsistent decisions, and that the generic 
proceeding could be of assistance in ensuring consistency 
in the setting of rates . . . with [Bell Atlantic] between and 
among the competitive LECs seeking such interconnection." 
(App. at 129a). The Board stated that of "great importance 
is the fact that this generic proceeding has allowed the 
Board to establish rates, terms and condition[s] for 
interconnection with [Bell Atlantic] . . . which are consistent 
statewide." (App. at 147a). In this respect, the Board noted 
that the separate arbitrations of AT&T and MCI with Bell 
Atlantic had yielded different results, even though the 
information considered was materially the same. Moreover, 
the Board noted, the AT&T/Bell Atlantic agreement was the 
only agreement that did not establish interim rates pending 
the Generic Proceeding. At the end of the memorandum, 
the Board provided a summation of its decision, in which it 
found that it was in the public interest to substitute the 
generic rates for the arbitrated rates in the AT&T/Bell 
Atlantic Interconnection agreement. 
 
On November 24, 1997, AT&T filed a complaint in the 
District Court seeking review of, among other things, the 
Board's decision to replace the arbitrated rates with the 
generic rates. On February 2, 1998, the District Court 
entered an order permitting the Advocate to intervene, 
aligned as a plaintiff. The Advocate subsequently adopted 
AT&T's pleadings. 
 
                                8 
 
 
Following briefing and oral argument, the District Court 
issued an opinion on June 6, 2000, "affirming the Board's 
decision to substitute generic rates for arbitrated rates 
as a proper exercise of authority under the 
[Telecommunications] Act." (App. at 13a-16a). The District 
Court also held, however, that the specific generic rates for 
interconnection established by the Board were the result of 
"arbitrary and capricious" decision-making. Thus, the 
District Court reversed the Board's generic rate 
determinations and remanded the case to the Board for 
further proceedings. The Advocate filed a notice of appeal 
from that portion of the District Court's decision which 
affirmed the Board's action of substituting the generic rates 
for the arbitrated rates. AT&T is not a party to this appeal. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 
47 U.S.C. S 252(e)(6), which provides that any party 
objecting to a final agreement approved by a State 
Commission may seek judicial review in a federal district 
court. We have jurisdiction over the Advocate's appeal from 
the District Court's affirmance of the Board's decision 




On appeal, the Advocate argues that the District Court 
erred in holding that the Telecommunications Act 
authorized the Board to substitute generic rates for the 
arbitrated rates in the AT&T/Bell Atlantic interconnection 
agreement. Initially, the appellees respond by arguing that 
the Advocate lacks standing to bring this appeal because 
the Advocate has not been aggrieved by the District Court's 
disposition, and because this Court's resolution of the 
issues raised in this appeal would afford the Advocate no 
actual affirmative relief. 
 
Because standing is a fundamental jurisdictional 
question, challenges to standing must be addressed before 
reaching the merits of an appeal. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). We have plenary 
review over questions of standing. Gen. Instrument Corp. of 
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Before delving into the doctrinal specifics of standing, we 
must first resolve a dispute between the parties as to the 
proper characterization of the Board's substitution of rates, 
as that dispute will, in part, determine the outcome of the 
standing issue. Throughout its briefs, the Advocate argues 
that the Board adopted a blanket policy that generic rates 
will supercede arbitrated rates in every instance and that 
the Board applied this policy to the AT&T/Bell Atlantic 
interconnection agreement. By contrast, the appellees view 
the Board's action to substitute the generic rates for the 
arbitrated rates in the AT&T/Bell Atlantic agreement as a 
fact-specific decision which was motivated by the peculiar 
deficiencies of the AT&T/Bell Atlantic arbitration. We 
believe that the latter view is more congruent with the 
record. 
 
To begin, the Board's December 2, 1997, memorandum 
(the Board's only written document addressing rate 
substitution) is, by its terms, a fact-specific decision to 
substitute rates only into the agreement between AT&T and 
Bell Atlantic. Indeed, as we mentioned before, the end of 
the memorandum provides a summary that expressly notes 
the peculiar circumstances of the AT&T/Bell Atlantic 
arbitration and makes a finding only as to that arbitration: 
 
       In summary, because the generic proceeding produced 
       a complete factual and legal record which has 
       permitted the Board to thoroughly evaluate all the 
       issues related to the introduction of local exchange 
       competition through interconnection, purchase of 
       unbundled network elements and resale, because it 
       was appropriate in the arbitrations to set interim rates 
       which would be modified upon issuance of the Board's 
       determinations in this proceeding, because the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because we ultimately dismiss the Advocate's appeal for lack of 
standing, we need not address the standard under 47 U.S.C. S 252(e)(6) 
for reviewing the merits of a State Commission's determination. 
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       arbitrator in the AT&T/[Bell Atlantic] arbitration did 
       not have a complete cost study record upon which to 
       rely, because the Board in the instant proceeding has 
       found significant flaws with the Hatfield model thus 
       convincing the Board that the Hatfield model cannot 
       alone form the basis of just and reasonable rates for 
       interconnection and unbundled network elements, 
       because of the uncertain legal landscape upon which 
       the parties, arbitrators and the Board have had to rely, 
       in light of all the considerations discussed herein, and 
       pursuant to the Board's inherent . . . authority, the 
       Board FINDS that it is in the public interest and in 
       accordance with law to apply the generic rates, terms 
       and conditions set forth in this Order to the 
       interconnection agreement to be entered between AT&T 
       and [Bell Atlantic] to the extent that those rates, terms 
       and conditions have not been successfully negotiated by 
       AT&T and [Bell Atlantic]. 
 
(App. at 155-56) (emphasis added). The "SUMMARY 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER" attached to the December 2, 
1997 memorandum is limited in a similar fashion: 
 
       The following is a summary of Board directives 
       contained herein for the convenience of the reader. 
       Details are contained in the text of this Decision and 
       Order. 
 
        . . . . 
 
       4) The Board ORDERS that this 60/40 weighting 
       factor is to be used for developing the cost of all 
       elements for which Hatfield 2.2.2 model results and 
       [Bell Atlantic] model results exists, utilizing the 
       appropriate inputs as discussed herein. [This sets 
       generic rates.] 
 
       5) The Board ORDERS that for those elements for 
       which only one cost study result exists [i.e. the 
       AT&T/Bell Atlantic agreement rates], that result is 
       to be used utilizing the appropriate inputs 
       discussed herein. 
       [This substitutes generic rates for arbitrated rates.] 
 
(App. at 156). 
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The narrow focus of the December 2, 1997 memorandum 
is reflected in the actual effect of the Board's decision. At 
the conclusion of the Generic Proceeding, there were only 
two categories of rates (apart from the generic rates) in 
existence in New Jersey: (1) those contained in approved or 
pending agreements, which were effective only until rates 
were determined in the Generic Proceeding, and (2) the 
arbitrated rates in the AT&T/Bell Atlantic agreement, 
which, because of the arbitrator's decision, were permanent 
rates. Because the first category of rates was already, 
through consent, scheduled to give way to the generic rates, 
the Board's substitution of rates only affected the arbitrated 
rates in the AT&T/Bell Atlantic interconnection agreement. 
 
Another important factor in characterizing the Board's 
action is its current position that its action, culminating in 
the December 2, 1997 memorandum, constituted a specific 
and one-time event. Specifically, the Board states in its 
briefs that it did not enact a general policy, and that "the 
Generic Order [i.e., the December 2, 1997 memorandum] 
does not preclude the prospective of negotiations or 
arbitrations" to arrive at rates different, and possibly more 
favorable, than the generic rates. 
 
We apply de novo review to a state agency's legal 
interpretation of the 1996 Act. See MCI Telecomm Corp v. 
Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 2001) 
[typescript at 43]. Such a legal interpretation would include 
the board's determination of the scope of its authority to 
alter rates determined by the parties to an interconnection 
agreement. Under this standard of review and with 
consideration of the clear language of the December 2, 
1997, memorandum and of the Summary Conclusion and 
Order, we find that the Board's current position on the 
limited nature of its rate substitution action is reasonable. 
Thus, we construe the Board's action as substituting 
specific rates into only the AT&T/Bell Atlantic arbitration, 




With this understanding of the Board's action, we now 
address the appellees' challenge to the Advocate's standing 
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on appeal. That challenge focuses on the constitutional 
requirements stemming from Article III, Section 2 of the 
United States Constitution. To demonstrate Article III 
standing, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing three 
elements: 
 
       First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact 
       --an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) 
       concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or 
       imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, 
       there must be a causal connection between the injury 
       and the conduct complained of--the injury has to be 
       fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
       defendant, and not . . . th[e] result[of] the independent 
       action of some third party not before the court. Third, 
       it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, 
       that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
       decision. 
 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) 
(citations and internal quotations and footnote omitted); see 
also Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(observing that the three elements of Article III standing are 
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability), cert. denied, 
121 S. Ct. 857 (2001). We conclude that the Advocate can 
demonstrate neither injury-in-fact nor redressability. 
 
As to injury-in-fact, the Advocate observes that New 
Jersey law expressly authorizes it to appear as a party on 
behalf of ratepayers in all utility matters before the Board. 
See N.J.S.A. S 13:1D-1. Relying on this statutory directive, 
the Advocate claims that there are five types of direct, 
palpable injury that it seeks to remedy. According to the 
Advocate: (1) retail prices charged by CLECs are higher 
because the Board's generic rates are higher than the 
arbitrated rates; (2) ratepayers will lose the benefits of 
continuous cost-cutting; (3) the Board's substitution of 
generic rates for arbitrated rates eliminates product and 
price diversity; (4) the Board's action will deter competitive 
entry into the local exchange market by raising entry costs 
and discouraging differentiation; and (5) the Advocate will 
suffer an increased workload arising from the foregoing four 
harms. We conclude that none of these alleged injuries 
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meets the rigorous constitutional standards for an injury- 
in-fact. 
 
First, because the District Court ordered the Board to 
redetermine its generic rates, it is unclear whether 
ratepayers will actually pay more or whether they will pay 
an improperly high rate. In the future, ratepayers will not 
be harmed by the rates set unless the Board improperly 
sets generic rates on remand. Cf. Envtl. Action v. FERC, 996 
F.2d 401, 406-07 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding injury-in-fact 
where a regulator sets rates higher than those sought by 
consumers). As to the latter four injuries, each of them 
depends upon continuing harms arising from the Board 
repeatedly substituting improperly high generic rates in the 
future. However, because the Board made a case specific 
decision to substitute rates into the AT&T/Bell Atlantic 
interconnection agreement and because those rates will be 
redetermined, we are constrained to reject these four 
alleged injuries. Therefore, having concluded that there is 
no injury-in-fact, we hold that the Advocate lacks standing 
to bring this appeal. 
 
Even if we were to determine that the Advocate suffered 
an injury-in-fact, we would still conclude that the Advocate 
lacks standing because its alleged injury is not redressable. 
There is no appropriate remedy that we can grant to the 
Advocate. Here, the District Court remanded the case to the 
Board for a redetermination of the rates in the Generic 
Proceeding. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to 
conceive of a remedy that would benefit the Advocate. That 
is, if we were to adopt the Advocate's position and reverse 
the District Court with respect to the Board's authority to 
substitute rates, that reversal would not change the result 
of the District Court's decision to remand the case for a 
redetermination. See Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. 
of Wausau, 952 F.2d 756, 759 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[A] party 
may appeal only if aggrieved by the district court's 
judgment. . . . [A] non-aggrieved party with no personal 
stake in the appeal may [not maintain the appeal]."). Thus, 
we conclude that the Advocate is asking us to render a 
purely theoretical opinion on the legal propriety of rate 
substitution under the Telecommunications Act. This is not 
a remedy we can provide, however, for we are prohibited 
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from issuing advisory opinions. See Roe v. Operation 
Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 861 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
The Advocate argues that a possible remedy is for this 
Court to extend the terms of the AT&T/Bell Atlantic 
interconnection agreement beyond July 31, 2000, its 
original termination date, and to impose arbitrated rates 
during that extended term. We deny this request. Before 
the District Court, both AT&T and Bell Atlantic explicitly 
rejected any use of the arbitrated rates after July 31, 2000. 
Moreover, the parties are now arbitrating a new 
interconnection agreement. Under these circumstances, we 
think that the Advocate's requested relief is neither 
available nor desired by the parties to the interconnection 
agreement. Thus, all told, we conclude that the Advocate's 
alleged injuries are not redressable and that therefore the 
Advocate lacks standing. 
 
Because the Advocate lacks standing to bring this appeal, 
we express no opinion on the arguments the Advocate 
raises concerning the Board's authority under the 
Telecommunications Act to substitute the generic rates for 





For these reasons, we will dismiss the appeal. 
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